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Unimagining Song: Making Kin in the Vocal Scene 
by Chris Tonelli 
The task set out for us in this curated section of the Yearbook is, from the perspective I 
present here, problematic. We are invited to consider utterances on the boundaries 
between speech and song, and I cannot help thinking that this is like being asked to 
consider bodies at the border between the air and Canada. Though the terms “speech” and 
“song” both have numerous meanings, speech generally refers to something relatively 
concrete: the use of the human voice to convey linguistic meaning. The term speech is 
like the term air; it refers to something intangible but still concrete. Song, on the other 
hand, is like Canada. It is a reification. How do we address the space between something 
concrete and something imagined? Song’s borders lie at a variety of distinct perceived 
locations. Unlike with speech, we cannot objectively determine the line between song and 
non-song.1 Even if no one shares your sense of where the borders of song lie, no one has 
the authority to claim you are wrong. Others may be correct to deem your judgment as 
culturally inappropriate in a given context, but not objectively untrue. If I hear all speech 
as song, you cannot prove me wrong. If you see all running as dance, I have no solid 
ground to assert that it’s not. We can quibble over intention and the importance of shared 
cultural conceptions, but ultimately there is no objectively verifiable way to confirm an 
utterance as song. 
                                                 
1
 This essay does not do justice to the complexity of distinct definitions of what constitutes speech. My 
argument here depends on a definition of speech that takes speech to be a medium for the transmission of 
messages. What makes speech verifiable as speech and more than mere reification is the presence of 
patterns that can be verified as shared conveyors of meaning. While there may be a case to be made for the 
existence of speech that cannot be objectively determined as speech, this case would not overshadow the 
broader distinction I am trying to point to here. Speech and song would remain distinct in this regard, at 
least in terms of degree. 
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In most considerations of song and speech it is irrelevant that song is a reification; 
what matters is people’s perception of the borders of song and speech, and the thoughts 
and feelings that arise as a result. However, I begin by pointing to this reification to make 
space for musicians with whom I have been working for sixteen years as a researcher and 
performer. These musicians participate in a tradition that I refer to as “soundsinging.” I 
have adopted the term, which was invented by the singer and poet Paul Dutton (Dutton 
quoted in Sutherland 2014), to refer to voiced and unvoiced oral music-making traditions 
that (1) emerged in the 1950s and beyond out of the practices of sound poetry, free jazz, 
scat, Fluxus, and experimental performance; and (2) incorporate to a substantial degree 
abstract sounds that are non-pitch based.2 My intention in this essay is not to provide a 
sustained analysis of the practice of soundsinging or its reception.3 Rather, I seek to 
briefly introduce soundsinging as a case study that can help us to understand some of the 
negative consequences of our reification of “song.” I hope to foster increased awareness 
of the possibility that all of our musical choices resonate in ways that affect how we feel 
connectedness across perceived borders of difference. In fact, it would be accurate to say 
that you have begun reading a manifesto of sorts—a manifesto that challenges us to see 
every choice we make as music-makers and music-describers as one that will either 
strengthen walls of division or reinforce a radical politics of trans-species solidarity. 
Soundsingers must frequently contend with others who mark their singing as non-
singing. Many singers, as a result, shy away from terms that locate their practices outside 
                                                 
2
 Voiced and unvoiced oral sound are both regular components of nearly all vocal practices. Dutton (1992) 
makes special effort to combat the common subsuming of both of these areas under the category of vocal 
practice by drawing attention to non-vocal oral sounds in his discussions of soundsinging. Soundsinging 
often involves more sustained exploration of non-vocal oral sounds—for example, modulation of sounds 
produced by airflow between the cheeks and teeth—than many other vocal practices.  
3
 I currently am working on a book-length history of soundsinging. The book will also expand the 
theoretical paths that are at the heart of this essay.  
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of the powerful social institutions of singing and song, even rejecting terms like 
soundsinging for their distancing effect. Other soundsingers, like myself, have adopted 
the term, finding it necessary to have a way of referring to differences between this style 
of singing and the much more broadly accessed traditions of pitch-focused song. My 
comfort in using the term here, despite others’ refusal, arises from the fact that “singing” 
is a part of “soundsinging.” Like those who refuse the term, I too insist that soundsinging 
is singing. And while soundsinging does not fit some culturally situated definitions of 
singing or song-making, I insist that the wider institution of song, created by the many 
diverse and contradictory uses of the term, holds too much power for soundsingers to 
simply accept that their work is non-singing or non-song. And so I begin with this 
reminder: song and singing are reifications. As institutionalized categories they can be 
used to Other some song as non-song and some singing as non-singing. Troubling these 
categorical presumptions is the core task I have set out for this essay.  
While the question of liminality afforded by vocal utterances that are experienced 
as song-like speech or speech-like song is a productive one, I also would like us to 
consider a view where there is no “between” between song and speech. In one way, my 
rejection of this between reflects the insistence of some soundsingers that all speech is 
song (and thus all semantic song bears no distinction from speech). In another way, I 
intend this rejection as a starting point for a theoretical model that can stand alongside the 
between-speech-and-song model (List 1963). Offering an alternative conception that 
refuses to posit this betweenness helps us challenge ideological attempts to police the 
borders of song. My hope is that this alternative model will also help us to consider 
liminal states that result from encounters with voice as well as the outcomes of the 
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experience of those states. I will suggest that conceptions of song that Other certain songs 
as non-song belong to an institution that Suzanne Cusick has referred to as Song with a 
capital S. I will also follow Cusick in positing that an equivalent institution of Speech 
exists. I will stray somewhat from her example and suggest that the two categories should 
be conceptualized as one contiguous domain without a space between: SongSpeech. 
Rather than liminalities that arise from speech blurring with song, the liminalities I will 
consider arise from the unwillingness to hear certain song as Song or certain speech as 
Speech. The liminal states that I will ask us to attend to emerge when the norms of 
SongSpeech are perceived by listeners invested in the power of this category to have been 
violated. 
Inspired by Donna Haraway’s recent work, I offer this essay as an invitation to 
participate in an ambitious project. In Staying with the Trouble (2016), Haraway asks 
nothing less of her readers than to help eliminate Othering altogether. While the goal of 
eliminating Othering may seem unrealistic or shockingly naïve, Haraway argues its 
plausibility given that “neither biology nor philosophy any longer supports the notion of 
independent organisms in environments” (2016:50). Such a goal, moreover, is essential to 
planetary survival. She urges us to both awaken ourselves to interconnection and to 
identify in ways that are “sympoietic” rather than “autopoietic.” Autopoietic imaginings 
envision the self as part of a bounded and closed category, while sympoietic imaginings 
recognize that “nothing is really autopoietic” and that the imagination of oneself as 
belonging to a closed or exclusive category is a dangerous myth (ibid.:75). Sympoietic 
identifications affirm that the self is co-extensive with all other beings; the self differs 
from other beings but, at the same time, they cannot be understood as absolutely separate. 
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In Haraway’s terms, this situation is described as a “worlding-with, in company” where 
difference is omnipresent but we are neither One with nor Other from that which we 
differ (ibid.:75, 110). This refusal to imagine other beings as absolutely Other, of course, 
is reflective of many indigenous worldviews, but at odds with the western liberal 
humanist lens through which many of us view our world. Haraway’s work attempts to 
reshape that lens in a manner I find productive, both for her goal of fostering forms of 
identification that might aid planetary survival and for my immediate—and not 
unrelated—task of coming to an understanding of the relationship between song and 
speech.  
The subtitle of Haraway’s Staying with the Trouble is Making Kin in the 
Chthulucene. Throughout the book, Haraway performs and deepens her sympoietic 
attachment to spiders, octopi, worms, compost, and many other real and imagined 
materialities and lifeforms we often position as Others. The creature, Chthulu, referenced 
in the title of her book might be the best example of the kinds of radical identification for 
which she is arguing. Chthulu, in Haraway’s work, at once refers to: (1) a particular 
species of spider, Pimoa Cthulhu;4 (2) a fictional creature with wings and an octopus-like 
face created by American fantasy author H.P. Lovecraft (1890–1937); and (3) Pimoa 
Chthulu, Haraway’s imaginary combination of the non-fictional spider and the fictional 
Chthulu. By sharing the way her feelings of passion for a fictional character can help her 
identify more strongly with a non-fictional arachnid, she shows that the “real” and the 
imagined can combine to form productive trans-species identifications (ibid.:48). 
 Haraway writes that the 
                                                 
4
 The slightly different spellings Cthulhu and Cthulu are not errors. These are separate words/referents.  
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decisions and transformations so urgent in our times for learning again, or for the 
first time, how to become less deadly, more response-able, more attuned, more 
capable of surprise, more able to practice the arts of living and dying well in 
multispecies symbiosis, sympoiesis, and symanimagenesis on a damaged planet, 
must be made without guarantees or the expectation of harmony with those who 
are not oneself—and not safely other, either. (ibid.:110) 
Here, she is asking us to regenerate our concept of ourselves such that we refuse to Other, 
even while recognizing the ubiquity of difference. She asks that we do so in a way that 
cultivates identification with the materialities and lifeforms we most frequently have been 
encouraged to treat with disgust. At a moment of multilayered crisis—when human 
beings are backsliding into social fragmentation and isolation, resurging nationalism, 
rising hate-crime levels, insufficient responses to environmental crisis, and celebration of 
the abnegation of social responsibility—it is urgent that we focus on Othering as a 
process at the root of all these horrors. It is important that we work to see the connections 
between strategies of division in our fields of study and practice, and the social divisions 
that have led us into this period that Adriana Cavarero calls “the most extensive and 
anomalous … chapter in the human history of destruction” (1999:2). 
Reading Staying with the Trouble, I am reminded of many statements 
soundsingers have made about their vocal practices and sonic kinships. Rather than 
cultivating spaces where a limited range of vocal sounds are privileged and permitted to 
sound, soundsingers frequently speak of their practices as spaces where all vocal sound is 
kin. Christine Duncan is a singer/soundsinger based in Toronto, Canada. Duncan devotes 
a large amount of her time to fostering a choir, called the Element Choir, that makes 
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space for participants to use their voice in any way that they would like. The Element 
Choir is open, without cost, to anyone who wishes to join. Duncan describes how as a 
participant you “can kind of do anything that your imagination will allow” (interview, 11 
August 2014). This radical openness does not, of course, appear wherever soundsinging 
is present. In fact, Duncan also recounts how song, in a pitch- or melody-privileging 
sense of the term, gets policed in soundsinging environments. She describes how: 
even in my full-on improv gigs, I’ll sing songs if it feels like the right thing to do. 
That’s pretty unusual. For a lot of people who are “sounding” people, that’s kind 
of taboo. They’re not into it. But, I really, really firmly believe that if you’re 
actually in that space and it’s actually happening, whatever the resource material 
is, should be at your disposal to use. (interview, 11 August 2014) 
Her descriptions reveal how spaces of soundsinging sometimes manifest Song, a force 
that prohibits and Others certain vocal expressions. At the same time, she affirms the 
distinct presence in that same space of an attitude of openness to all human vocal 
sounds—to the notion that “whatever the resource,” it “should be at your disposal.”  
If there exists a musical space for sympoietic identification with all vocal sound, 
then soundsinging, with its devotion to openness, may be the means toward it—even if it 
sometimes manifests Song. As they strive to create a space where all vocal sound is 
accepted, soundsingers also seek out and embrace a wide range of sounds that others 
have Othered. Like Haraway’s kin-making, these encounters with difference are also 
modes of self-discovery. Soundsingers discover that these sounds that others have 
Othered are parts of themselves that they have been discouraged from finding. Haraway’s 
multispecies alliances can be thought of in the same way; sympoiesis requires us to 
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recognize the truth that we come into being relationally, dialectically; thus if we establish 
a sense of self by Othering, the Other has effectively co-produced us and cannot be 
understood as truly Other. The Other constitutes and is thus present in the self. 
Still, the perception of soundsinging as a potentially sympoietic vocal space 
where no utterances are Othered stands in contrast to the spaces of public soundsinging 
performance; conflicts arise in these spaces when listeners police soundsingers and their 
sounds. The liminalities that arise in and around soundsinging contain lessons that can 
help us to understand and undo Othering. Refusals to hear soundsinging as singing are 
connected to refusals to hear the sounds of soundsinging as human. After my 
performances and the performances of other soundsingers, I have heard many listeners 
assert that the sounds produced by the soundsinger’s human body belong more properly 
to the category of animal sound. In my essay, “Ableism and the Reception of Improvised 
Soundsinging” (Tonelli 2016), I detail these speech acts in ways that I will resist 
repeating here. For now, I ask that we accept that this form of Othering is common and 
move straight to considering the connections between marking soundsinging as non-
singing and the refusal to hear these sounds, which are clearly emerging from a human 
body, as human.  
To assess these connections effectively, in a manner that does not devolve into the 
kinds of human exceptionalism Haraway asks that we do away with, we can return to the 
conceptions of Song and Speech (after Cusick 1999). In this model, capital-S Speech and 
capital-S Song are associated with “entry into Law” (1999:31).5 That is, they are modes 
of interpellation into vocal soundings that undergird a particular symbolic logic that 
bestows privilege on those who Other. To Speak or to Sing (but not speak or sing) is to 
                                                 
5
 I take Cusick's reference to “Law” to signify non-formalized social norms and prohibitions.   
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use your voice in a way that helps to reassert the validity of a logic of division that marks 
certain human bodies as valuable and others as less valuable or without value. In her 
essay, Cusick theorizes Speech and Song almost exclusively in relation to the way we 
conform to the Law in terms of our gendered performance of voice. She argues that 
Singing “replicates acceptance of patterns that are intelligible to one’s cohort in a 
culture” (1999:30) and gives the example of how women are encouraged in their adult 
Speech and Song to keep operating in the register of their prepubescent voice in order to 
produce a socially intelligible femininity. This, as Cusick points out, requires the 
rejection of other registers, other affordances of their adult vocal apparatus. The case of 
soundsinging extends Cusick’s discussion of social expectations for gendered vocal 
performance to the related social requirements that we perform our humanness and our 
able-bodiedness vocally. 
Nina Eidsheim’s (2014) work helps us to understand that demands are also placed 
on us to perform vocally in a manner that accords with the ways our bodies have been 
racialized. In her essay, “Race and the Aesthetics of Vocal Timbre,” she looks at western 
classical voice instructors as a source of this demand, examining how their “perceptions 
of students’ ethnicities generally shape their understanding of how the students might 
develop as singers” (2014:341). Song and Speech can be thought of as spaces where 
socially scripted demands—about performance of race, gender, and humanness—are 
entangled, and where singers and speakers are under pressure to conform vocally to 
soundings that help maintain social divisions that both privilege and Other.  
We can follow and extend Cusick’s model by distinguishing between the human 
and the Human. When listeners react to soundsinging by calling human vocal sounds 
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animal sound, this should be understood—in most cases—as more than a mere statement 
of resemblance. It is often a means of chastising singers for their failure to provide 
sounds that articulate connections between their bodies and a privileged category of the 
fully Human. Unlike song, the human is more than a reification. The categorical 
difference between human bodies and non-human bodies is concrete. However, this 
distinction has nothing to do with the distinction between Human and non-Human. To be 
Human does not mean to be composed of the material qualities that separate the human 
and non-human; it is to perceive oneself as occupying a privileged category that excludes 
some materially human bodies in much the same way that Song does not include all song. 
The Human, like Song and Speech, is a symbolic space that yields identity security 
through symbolic processes of Othering. 
Cusick provides us with a framework wherein Song and Speech seem relatively 
static. They represent the most dominant demands for vocal conformity and not more 
minoritarian versions of the same demand. For example, in one of the two case studies 
she provides, she discusses a specific singer’s “renunciation of Song” (1999:34). This 
renunciation, she theorizes, is performed by singing “with a harsh, forced timbre” that 
“gives voice to his resolve to police the border” of his body, “exercising strict control 
over what gets in and what comes out” (1999:34–35). In her essay, Cusick does not 
consider—at least not overtly—that while this timbral choice may be subject to policing 
or even read as a form of negotiated opposition in certain contexts, it might also manifest 
as Song. That is, song manifests as Song insofar as one style of singing is acting as a 
norm against which other styles are policed. In other words, though I borrow the concepts 
of Song and Speech from Cusick, my framework for these concepts differs from hers. I 
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would like us to locate Song anywhere that the line between acceptable and unacceptable 
vocal utterance is policed in the service of a broader symbolic logic that privileges and 
Others. Song, in the sense I am positing here, is not tied to any particular tradition of 
singing, but manifests wherever forms of singing serve as “evidence” of the greater 
Humanness of a group that does not include all singers. 
Liminality might best be understood as a state wherein we feel a lack of access to 
the kinds of identity security that emerge through confident imagination of ourselves as 
singularly belonging to an established, concrete, and valuable social category. Though 
liminality can signify a liberating state or an uncompromising position between two 
distinct but comfortably co-existing external realms, it can also signify a highly 
threatening encounter incongruous with a symbolic order that we have elevated to the 
status of truth and that we depend on for our sense of self-worth. The concept of 
liminality is useful for understanding why listeners go out of their way after soundsinging 
performances to label the sounds they heard as non-Human. We can theorize that 
audience members who make efforts to tell soundsingers that their human vocal sounds 
are not singing—that they make no sense, that they sound like dogs barking, dying cats, 
or copulating pigs—do so precisely because their experience of soundsinging forced 
them into a liminal state. The performance caused them to perceive themselves as divided 
between two incongruous states: a state where their own Human bodies were containers 
of non-Human sounds and, paradoxically, a preferred state where this would be 
impossible. 
Liminal states are brought to the fore of listeners’ consciousnesses when the 
materiality that listeners associate with their own privileged side of a symbolic divide 
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(e.g., Human–Animal) becomes entangled with the materiality they associate with 
Others. In most cases, it is likely the soundsinger’s body that displays qualities that 
prompt identification for these listeners. They see the singer’s body and they imagine it 
and their own body as belonging to the same exclusive category: Human. When the 
singer sounds, however, a dissonance arises. Sounds emerging from a body perceived as 
Human fail to reproduce the symbolic hierarchy that sustains the presence of the category 
of Human. Given the intersubjective nature of reception, articulation of sounds perceived 
as Other with a vocalizing body perceived as Human—the categorical equivalent of the 
listener's body—symbolically entangles those sounds with the body and being of the 
listener. Through these imaginings, the listener is thrust into a liminal state between the 
incongruous spaces of Human and Other. This liminality is experienced by some as 
enlivening and by others as threatening (and by others as both simultaneously, to varying 
degrees). The labour of publicly asserting that these vocalizations belong more properly 
to animals can be theorized as an attempt to repair the symbolic division that the 
performance violated and to dissipate the space of liminality these listeners found 
themselves thrust into and threatened by. By defining those sounds as Other, the listener 
begins to alleviate the crisis state by reinstating the symbolic divisions the performance 
unravelled. 
The same kind of enlivening/threatening liminality can arise in processes where 
Speech is invoked and then violated by a perceived transition out of Speech and into a 
domain that may or may not be perceived as song. Dutch poet and (sound)singer Jaap 
Blonk’s performances of his poems “Der Minister I” and “Der Minister II” (from his Flux 
de Bouche ) might well be experienced in this way by certain listeners. In these 
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performances, Blonk begins by speaking the German phrase “der minister bedauert 
derartige äusserungen” (the minister regretted such utterances). Performances of “Der 
Minister I” repeat the phrase three times, then continue repeating the phrase but with the 
successive omissions of one, two, or three vowels, or successive vowel sets, from the end 
of the phrase with each repetition so that the fourth repetition yields “der minister 
bedauert derartige äusser ng n,” the fifth “der minister bedauert derartige ss r ng n,” and 
so on (Blonk 1992a). Performances of “Der Minister II” repeat the phrase three times and 
then continue repeating the phrase but with the successive omissions of two, three, or 
four consonants, or successive consonant sets, with each repetition from the start of the 
phrase so that the fourth repetition of the phrase is “e minister bedauert deartige 
äusserungen,” the fifth is “e i ister bedauert deartige äusserungen,” and so on (Blonk 
1992b).  
The poem begins in a way that listeners are likely to experience as Speech or, at 
least, speech, and it proceeds into vocal utterances that lose semantic qualities and 
resemble abstract soundsinging. Regardless of precisely how the transition is 
experienced, here is an example of a stream of vocal utterance capable of invoking the 
kinds of liminality I am theorizing, through what might be perceived as a space between 
speech and song. In the comments on Blonk’s YouTube videos, for example, one listener 
attempts to devalue his performance through policing gestures; these gestures are 
suggestive of a liminal state that arose through the listener’s experience of the 
performance as a transition from Speech to song or Speech to non-speech.6 
                                                 
6
 YouTube user BlondiChampi Volca responded to a recorded performance of “Der Minister II” with the 
comment “Bref un mec qui a une crise de folie devant un micro c’est tout!!!,” which can be translated as 
“In short, a guy who has a fit of madness in front a microphone, that’s it!!!” (Blonk 1992b). Alongside 
animals, listeners often respond to soundsinging by invoking states in which one has lost control of one’s 
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The chain of events and actions that yield these liminal states begins with 
investment in Song, Speech, and/or the Human. It begins by connecting certain vocal 
utterances with meaning and positioning others as less valuable. It begins with the 
presence of bodies perceived, pre-utterance, as “fully-Human” and with the expectations 
listeners have for SongSpeech in the moment before the soundsinger sounds or sounds 
again. To Sing is to sing in a manner that provides identity security to listeners who 
identify by imagining a self/Other divide that validates the self and devalues the Other. 
Applied to these processes, Donna Haraway’s work encourages us to recognize this form 
of identification as autopoietic. That is, as forming a sense of identity security from 
creating bounded, unequal categories of being, rather than through a sympoietic identity 
that gains security from a sense of interconnectedness and equality across categories of 
difference. 
This autopoietic–sympoietic distinction helps us to extend the framework posited 
thus far. Rather than thinking through the liminal spaces between song and speech, I have 
been considering the liminality present beyond the borders of SongSpeech. But liminality 
is not about outsides; it is about between-states of being. If the liminality I am theorizing 
here is just out of reach of processes that secure identity through Othering, then what we 
imagine to lie on the other side of this betweenness should be processes that secure 
identity through a refusal to Other. Haraway (2016) argues that difference does not 
require opposition; recognition of the distinct is not identical to recognition of Otherness. 
                                                                                                                                                 
body. Bodies out of control, paradoxically, are also positioned as not fully Human. Invoking epileptics and 
the mentally ill simultaneously deHumanizes these groups and polices soundsinging. The same user also 
commented on a separate YouTube page on “Der Minister I,” saying: “On dirait un mec qui fait une crise 
d’épilepsie,” which can be translated as “It sounds like a guy having an epileptic seizure,” invoking, again, 
a loss of control to explain Blonk’s intentional, highly controlled delivery. See Blonk (1992a, 1992b).  
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As such, securing identity in a field where we never posit absolute difference, even as we 
acknowledge the ubiquity of difference, should be imaginable and achievable. 
How do our perceptions of song and speech reinforce divides between human and 
Human? As musicians and musicologists, how can we counter these processes of 
Othering? I believe that reception-centred study of soundsinging points us in a productive 
direction. The kind of vocal performances that prompt audience members to police the 
voice are vocal performances that we should make special efforts to embrace as kin, at 
least until the point that Othering responses aren’t prevalent among audiences. Jacques 
Rancière (2010) helps us to understand that acts of policing are the only measure of the 
political in art. He argues that only when audiences act to police art, to remove it from the 
domain of the doable and sayable, can we recognize that art as political. The forms of 
policing to which soundsingers have been subjected are measures of the political efficacy 
of their soundings. We can recognize the presence of these policing gestures as proof that 
the sounds of soundsinging are doing work that is political in Rancière’s sense of the 
term; these gestures are evidence that a self-privileging and Other-diminishing symbolic 
order has been disrupted to some degree. This sounds rather arrogant coming from a 
practitioner, but I do not intend this statement to confer some kind of universal value on 
the work of soundsingers. The status of the work as capable of political effects is 
contingent on the environment in which it is placed. So it is not the music itself that has 
been efficacious, but the combination of the music with listeners who perceived its 
sounds in a manner that spurred them to police the performer. 
A second caveat is necessary here: not all policing of music is a reaction to the 
symbolic implications of the music. There exist forms of policing related to actual 
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physical harm caused directly or indirectly by music. Still, as music-makers and 
musicologists, we should concern ourselves whenever listeners make attempts to prevent 
music they have heard from re-entering the domain of the audible. When listeners refer to 
soundsingers’ vocalizations as animal sound—that is, when their speech acts mark 
soundsinging as non-Human—their policing is intended, in most cases, to convince 
soundsingers that their sounds lack value and therefore should be abandoned in favour of 
fully Human forms of vocal performance. These comments rarely, if ever, manifest as 
celebrations of the value of animal sound; rather, they appear as corrective strategies for 
upholding fantasies of division.  
Haraway’s (2016) work reminds us that, in our age of multilayered crisis, our 
survival depends on our ability to persistently envision interconnectedness. Too often in 
music communities, our vision of interconnectedness is blindly celebratory; we proudly 
celebrate the ways music brings people together while rarely pausing to consider the 
ways music excludes. I think that we benefit from a model that reminds us that music is 
often a tool of division and harm—a model that prompts us to understand Song as a 
domain that prevents the kinds of kin-making that Haraway regards as essential to our 
survival. 
The liminality that we are thrust into when we encounter certain sounds may be 
unpleasant or uncomfortable, but we need to recognize that feeling of discomfort as a 
sign that we have arrived at a space in which we can think our way to a more sustainable 
and less “horroristic” future (Cavarero 1999).7 When we arrive in these spaces where we 
                                                 
7
 Cavarero’s 1999 book Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence coins the neologism horrorism as a 
tool to refocus our attention from the ends of violent acts to their means. Doing so, she argues, deprivileges 
the perspectives of those who enact violence, replacing them with the perspectives of victims of violence. 
The future Haraway seeks to avoid might be best understood as horroristic.  
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desire to remove certain sounds from the realm of the audible, we can examine the 
symbolic processes behind those impulses. We can ask ourselves whether we are 
offended because some actual physical harm results from the presence of the sounds, or if 
the sounds merely offend our sense of who and what we find valuable. Further, we can 
ask ourselves if we can alter our relationship with those sounds. Can we enter into a 
sympoietic relation where we become champions of the offending sounds for the sake of 
our own survival and survival at large? Championing the vocal sounds that others have 
Othered and that we ourselves may have once Othered means helping these sounds to 
find audibility and presence in spaces they otherwise would not occupy; but it also means 
more than that. Making kin is not merely supporting others. It is identifying with them: 
coming to understand that there is no you without them and that a Song that refuses them 
refuses part of you and part of everyone—even those who work to uphold Song as Song 
and the Human as the Human. 
Haraway reminds us repeatedly in Staying with the Trouble (2016) that who and 
what we think with matters. If our frameworks make matters of urgency unthinkable, we 
need to find better frameworks—new partners for thinking. While the between-speech-
and-song framework can help us to understand the ways that many receptions of voice 
unfold, it does not leave space for consideration of soundsinging and for the perceptions 
that the practice affords. The kinds of liminality that I have theorized here often do arise 
when vocal performances are perceived as simultaneously song-like and speech-like to 
varying degrees. The kinds of song that might activate Song may need to perform 
distance from the qualities of speech as a domain to which nearly every human has 
access. While there frequently exists a reified and perceived space between song and 
  
 18 
speech, I propose that there is no between when it comes to Song and Speech. They are 
both dimensions of an undifferentiated Law that, itself, is defined by the way it divides 
us. The liminal spaces just outside of SongSpeech are a middle space between that 
monolith and something we might refer to as “symsong”—a space where we hear and 
sing ourselves into being-with with sounds that are different but never Other. We have a 
choice as musicians, listeners, and researchers: Which side of the SongSpeech–symsong 
divide do we want to cultivate with our labour? Can we learn to hear and to think the 
presence of musical harm? Can we learn to hear the interconnections of sounds 
(de)valued as (un)musical and rising nationalism, widening inequality, environmental 
inaction, emboldened hate groups, diminishing corporate accountability? Can we can take 
notice of the moments when our own desires to police sounds arise and flip these 
impulses into opportunities to make kin? 
Cultivating awareness of our categorical imaginings and how we might unimagine 
them might help us with these tasks. To this end, I close this reflection by recounting one 
soundsinger’s long journey into eliminating the space between speech and music. In his 
essay “The Speech–Music Continuum” (2012), Paul Dutton recounts an encounter he had 
in 1982 with a vocal quartet called the Extended Vocal Techniques Ensemble (EVTE), 
comprising the singers Phil Larson, Deborah Kavasch, Ed Harkins, and Linda 
Vickerman. EVTE was performing at the same festival as Dutton and his quartet The 
Four Horsemen, a group of poets who collaborated to stage ensemble performance poetry 
that frequently was completely abstract and improvised. Dutton describes how EVTE 
“were uttering sounds similar to and identical with” those made by The Four Horsemen 
and he asked himself “what it was that qualified them as musicians” and The Four 
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Horsemen “as poets” (2012:124). He came to the conclusion that “when one of them 
whistled, it was a note, but when [he] whistled, it was a syllable.” This continued to be 
how he perceived the divide for years following the encounter (ibid.). However, about a 
decade later, around the same time that he innovated the term soundsinging, Dutton 
began to understand the division that he had previously essentialized as “a pointless 
exercise in pedantry” (ibid.:125). He came to believe that the division was merely “a 
matter of weighting things in one direction or another” and he realized that, as a listener, 
he could “listen with delight to a crowd of people talking all at once … as the collective 
creation of a large free-improvisational orchestra” (ibid.). Dutton abandoned his author-
centred sense of essentialized divisions for a listener-centred recognition that speech 
could be attended to as music. Not merely certain kinds of heightened speech that also 
bore resemblance to the commonplace definitions of song, but also “the pitch variation 
and phonetic durations of everyday speech” (ibid.). 
As we contemplate the spaces between speech and song, we can keep both 
Dutton’s early essentialism and his later de-essentialized listening in mind. For some 
listeners, there is no “between” to be perceived between speech and song. For others 
there is. Sometimes these perceptions are benign and other times they serve symbolic 
processes that lead to horror. We need a better understanding of these symbolic processes 
and a resolve to contribute to both fostering and staging sympoietic identifications within 
musical settings. When we stage sympoietic kinship across perceived symbolic divides, 
we create opportunities for listeners to unimagine those divides. If these listeners feel 
included and respected in the constructions we offer, they may well abandon imaginings 
of alterity in favour of new modes of identification across difference. All of us can pause 
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and reconsider our reactions when sounds compel us to register them as Others. All of us 
can take action to help unimagine Song. 
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